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Thinking about Peace Today
MICHAEL ALLEN Fox
University of New England
School of Humanities
Discussing peace-and how to get to and maintain situations,
practices, and socio-political structures that build peace-is of
the greatest urgency. But the first step, both psychologically and
epistemologically, is overcoming preoccupation with war and resis-
tance to thinking about peace. This article takes on these problems
and lays essential groundwork for substantive discussion of peace.
Attractions of war and myths of war are deconstructed, and nega-
tive views of humans' capacity for peaceful behavior are examined
and rejected. Wide-ranging costs of war and war-preparedness are
also exposed. The value of peace is then discussed. A concluding
section offers a list of "home truths" (beliefs that invite universal
assent), from which constructive reflection on peace might begin.
Keywords: peace, peace-building, war, resistance, peaceful behavior
The Obstacle of War
Some of the best thinking about humans as social and polit-
ical beings has been devoted to peace. But a far greater amount
has undoubtedly been devoted to war. Indeed, war hovers,
like some abstract entity, just beneath the surface of daily life
and, tragically often enough, occupies the surface itself. Even
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when war is not "hot" in some geographical area near you, it
consumes many resources while biding its time and exercising
its metaphorical presence-as in the sentence just phrased. War
appears in everyday discourse not just as a metaphor but even
as a model for conscientious action. Campaigns to improve
the human lot, for example, are often characterized as: "war
on poverty," "war against climate change," "war on hunger,"
"1war against HIV/AIDS," "war on child abuse," and so on.
Over the past few years, the "war on terror" has been on the
front page and the evening news more or less daily, and this
ill-considered concept has licensed a spectrum of illegal and
immoral behaviors, from systematic lying by elected leaders
to the dark excesses of Abu Ghraib and Guantinamo, which
are comparable to wartime crimes of the past (Cortright, 2008).
Think you've heard it all? You haven't. Surfing the crest of the
war on terror wave, the Civil Aviation Authority of Australia
now declares "war on error" (Marchbank, 2009), an education-
al "roadshow" aimed at reducing pilot mistakes.
War is free for the taking in lots of ways. Some say that in
contrast, peace has to be "sold," that there is a problem of "mar-
keting peace" to those who know little and maybe think less
about it, or else are just downright skeptical of the idea. Why
should there be a problem of this kind? It seems absurd. But
let's accept the premise and see where we can go from there.
Peace scholar David Cortright remarked that: "Throughout
history the cause of peace has been on trial, standing like a
forlorn defendant before the court of established opinion,
misunderstood and maligned on all sides" (Cortright, 2008,
p. 1). Cortright's reflection suggests that the answer to the
"why" question posed earlier can be framed as follows: Peace
is an unfamiliar and poorly understood concept and reality.
Perhaps it has been too seldom experienced-or in the case of
some people, hardly tasted at all. Learned observers note that
there have been fewer inter-state wars in recent times; that de-
mocracies do not go to war with one another; and that war as a
useful extension of national policy and means of pursuing po-
litical objectives is a thing of the past. Perhaps so, but this does
not prevent wars from occurring in abundance, and increas-
ingly they are intra-state civil wars, guerrilla-led insurgencies,
explosions of ethnic violence, criminal power-struggles, and
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proxy wars. However, as war historian Jeremy Black cautioned,
It is possible that low-intensity warfare will be that
which is most common in the future, but, equally,
across much of the world there is no effective restraint
on the ambitions and activities of states, and the
continued combination of issues over which to dispute,
and bellicose leaderships, may lead to serious levels of
warfare between regular forces. (Black, 1998, p. 235)
Since war is such a familiar part of human life, past and
present, and peace, by contrast, occupies the shadows, it
follows that in order to think about peace, we first have to get
past thinking about war. This requires us to move beyond some
pretty formidable and influential ideas. These are, for example:
that war brings out the best qualities in men; that it is a "manly
art"; that it makes men out of boys; that a nation comes of
age through armed conflict, its defining moment being some
famous battle or a particular war; that the most honorable way
in which one can serve one's country (or group) is by shed-
ding blood for it. Such ideas have not served humanity well-
rather, just the opposite. They have led us blindly into more
and more wars, genocides, arms races, and ultimately, to the
constant state of war-readiness we find ourselves in today-a
kind of unending war, as some observers have called the situ-
ation. Wars have cost our species and the planet hugely both
in terms of their casualties and other consequences and the re-
sources consumed by war-preparedness. What is it all for? Are
we stuck forever within cultures of violence? Do we lack the
intelligence, will, moral fiber, and sense of world community
to find better ways of conducting our affairs? Is it in our genes
to be warriors? Is there something specifically wrong with
how males are constituted or socialized that leads to war? Are
there forces in history with their own irresistible momentum
that bring about periodic clashes? Or, on the other hand, are
there perhaps many valuable templates already in existence for
building relationships, negotiation strategies, trust, and modes
of behaving that can provide alternatives to war and even ter-
rorism? As Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd pondered in
2008, on the ninetieth anniversary of Armistice Day, "...is war
our permanent condition? Must every generation go through
17
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war to be reminded why there should be no war? Or can we
dare to do something different, can we dare to think something
different?" (Rudd, 2008). The questions pile up like the dead
and maimed that humans continue to produce in warfare.
Many have raised these questions and more, wondering
whether humans are fatefully warlike and locked into perenni-
al cycles of mortal combat. To be sure, no one can claim to have
complete answers to the deep questions about war because
abundant areas of uncertainty still persist in our knowledge
about our own species. Even if we could gather together all of
the world's psychologists and psychiatrists, it is unlikely they
could explain everything we need to know in order to create
a world free from war and violent conflict. But we can try to
move forward with the insights we've achieved and the tools
we have for understanding and promoting the factors that
make peace possible, with the aim of stimulating new and dif-
ferent thought and feeling processes that may promise better
choices than those made in the past.
War Myths
In keeping with the commitment to examine and move
beyond barriers that block thinking about peace, it will be
useful to expose some myths. Of course myths alone do not
explain war. A monocausal account could never do justice to
the complexities of war, and no attempt will be made here to
provide a comprehensive explanation of why wars occur. This
would be an entirely different and far more ambitious project.
But, whatever else might be said about war, it lives in the
domain of myth, and this applies both to the factors that help
bring it about and to those that create and sustain ideas such
as that of the "demonic enemy." As psychologist Lawrence
LeShan pointed out, war brings about a shift from the normal
or "sensory mode" of perceiving reality to a "mythic mode"
(LeShan, 1992) with a logic of its own. Journalist Chris Hedges,
who has reported on-the-scene from numerous wars, explained
this "logic":
The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its
destruction and carnage, it can give us what we long
for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for
18
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living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does
the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives
become apparent. ... And war is an enticing elixir. It
gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble. And
those who have the least meaning in their lives ... are
all susceptible to war's appeal. (Hedges, 2003, pp. 3-4)
Looking back at his own experience of war's addictive
allure, Hedges added: "The chance to exist for an intense
and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion,
seemed worth it in the midst of war-and very stupid once the
war ended" (Hedges, 2003, p. 5).
War also thrives on symbolism and imaginative associa-
tions, and it has been remarked, in this vein, that: "Wars com-
mence in our culture first of all, and we kill each other in eu-
phemisms and abstractions long before the first ... missiles
have been launched. ... The deformed human mind is the ulti-
mate doomsday weapon ... " (Thompson, as cited in Zwicker,
1983, p. 7).
It is partly these myths and subconscious connections to
which Black referred when he observed that in studying wars,
past or present, "Rather than focusing on individual conflicts,
it is more important to understand the values that made com-
promise unacceptable, force appear necessary and even desir-
able, and war seem crucial to identity and self-respect" (Black,
1998, p. 242).
According to the first and most prominent myth about war
the history of humankind is equivalent to the story of great
deeds done by famous rulers and leaders (mostly men) and the
wars they have prepared for and fought. Peace, viewed from
this standpoint, consists of the dull, uneventful periods in
between wars that are unworthy of investigation. Aside from
begging questions about the nature of peace, peace as a desir-
able goal, and avenues by which to reach a peaceful world, this
outlook neglects the positive phenomenon of peaceful every-
day interactions that predominate among humans (Fry, 2007;
Tomasello, 2009), as well as the perspective that history cannot
be written without reference to the actions and ways of life of
average people throughout the ages.
Second, there is the myth that wars solve human problems
and advance interests more effectively than other kinds of
19
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engagements. The fact that wars are recurrent should by itself
show that (with a very few, debatable exceptions) they do not
solve problems, or at best, do so only temporarily and partial-
ly, while sowing the seeds for nationalism, inter-group hatred,
revenge-seeking, defective political arrangements and bound-
aries, and therefore, for future conflict. At the end of the day
communication, respectful coexistence, and sometimes even
forgiveness and reconciliation, are the only ways to bury hos-
tilities with finality. As one social scientist observed, "What all
wars have in common is the unmistakable moral lesson that
homicide is an acceptable, even praiseworthy, means to certain
ends" (MacNair, 2003, p. 51). But following this go-nowhere
teaching can only yield negative feedback: aggression begets
more aggression, violence, more violence, and war, more war,
if they remain unchecked by negotiation and nonviolent reso-
lution. Surely bitter experience has taught us that there is no
"war to end war"-or has it?
A third, associated myth is that wars-or "military actions"
that perpetrators seek not to have thought of as wars, inva-
sions, or acts of aggression-are undertaken (always) in defense
of shared ideals and a cherished way of life. On the contrary,
historical examples show that in warfare, economic, class, and
other factors are often front-and-center, and that private politi-
cal aspirations, the jingoism of particular interest groups, and
various ideological factors are rife. While it is simplistic and
one-dimensional to argue that in all wars the poor and disad-
vantaged serve the interests of the rich and powerful, a stark
slogan from the First World War-"A bayonet is a weapon
with a worker on both ends"-makes us wonder whether this
perspective embodies a significant grain of truth. Widespread
opposition to, and public demonstrations against, the Vietnam
War and the Iraq War, both in America and abroad, also bring
into focus the question of whose values, interests, and political
judgments were driving these conflicts.
The preceding paragraph may put one in mind of a fourth
myth, expressed in the belief that traditional notions of a
just war can still be defended today. While just war theory
has a long and distinguished career, to be sure, in the age of
aerial bombardment, and nuclear and other contemporary
weapons, killing has become actually and potentially more
20
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indiscriminate, making the concept of "just war" highly
tenuous. And because, as mentioned previously, warfare
not only promotes actions that would be considered clearly
immoral in any other context, and frequently serves vested
interests of one kind or another, it may turn out that just war
theory will itself become either a casualty of philosophical cri-
tiques (Francis, 2004) or at least an extremely restricted catego-
ry for rationalizing armed conflict (Lucas, 2007).
Fifth, there is the myth that human nature is inherently
aggressive and warlike. A widely-held theory claims that war
"has played an integral role in our evolution." Specifically,
"[t]he theory ... suggests the cooperative skills we've had to
develop to be effective warriors have turned into the modern
ability to work towards a common goal" (Holmes, 2008, p. 8).
Some might infer that such a view is perhaps merely another
vaguely disguised glorification of war, a coopting of our peace-
ful instincts by a view about our inborn (biologically deter-
mined) aggressiveness. However, it would be facile to draw
these conclusions, given that the theory stems from research
findings in a number of fields that tend toward a consensus.
More importantly, the outlook under consideration tells us
that although cooperative tendencies evolved from warlike
ones, they have taken on a life of their own and thus play a
real, independent role in human affairs. Looking at the theory
in this way helps us avoid endorsing the fallacious belief that
how things once were tells us how they will be, ought to be,
or even must be. What has occurred or might have occurred
during the ancient (and not so ancient) past life of our species
is a very unreliable and not necessarily desirable guide to how
things might or should be, either now or in the future. The
premise for the statement just made is that humans are capable
of choice, rational reflection and analysis, and hence also of
change. Unless one accepts some form of rigid determinism,
no biological or anthropological account can provide every-
thing we require in order to understand the past or plan for
the future. Not only this, but humans are showing every sign
of being able to control their own future evolution. ("Being
able" does not, of course, entail that we are yet willing to take
on the task in a responsible manner, and to use this potential
wisely.) While some aspects of human nature may be relatively
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constant, our species is noteworthy for having reinvented
itself many times over. As recent brain research on "neuroplas-
ticity" keeps demonstrating, humans are not so "hard-wired"
into stereotypical patterns of thinking and response as many
suppose (Doidge, 2007; Eliot, 2009).
A century ago, William James, psychologist, philosopher,
confirmed pacifist, and proponent of the idea that humanity
exists in a state of unending war, confidently proclaimed-as
if it were a truism needing no argumentative or empirical
support: "Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone
and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it
out of us" (James, 1987/1910, p. 1283). But as we've seen, this
view is now being challenged on both historical and scientif-
ic grounds. And if recently proposed revisions to Darwinian
theory prevail, the previously scorned idea that "environment
can alter heredity" may eventually take hold (Burkeman, 2010),
opening up new possibilities for changing human behavior for
the better-if we so choose.
We can now begin to see more clearly that evolutionary
traits revealed in the human past do not license inferences
about the inevitability of war and other forms of violent con-
flict in the future. The claim that "war is in our genes," there-
fore, should be rejected. Leaving aside possible supplements
to the theory of natural selection, a growing body of empiri-
cal research tends toward the conclusion that, even if humans'
evolution into peaceful beings is not guaranteed, it's equally
evident that war cannot simply be rationalized as a kind of
"biological compulsion" (Horgan, 2009). Furthermore, inas-
much as belief in the inevitability of something tends to make
that thing inevitable (a self-fulfilling prophecy), we need to be
on guard against any such belief, for it negates humans' deci-
sion-making capacity and consequently the ability to change
the course of events in which they are involved. Immanuel
Kant, the brilliant Enlightenment philosopher, entertained the
theory that:
war itself requires no particular motivation, but appears
to be ingrained in human nature and is even valued as
something noble; indeed, the desire for glory inspires
men to it, even independently of selfish motives.
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Consequently, courage in war (among American Indians
as well as during Europe's chivalric period) is judged
to be of immediate and great worth not only during
war (as is reasonable), but also in order that war might
be, and often war is begun only as a means to display
courage. As a result, an intrinsic worth is bestowed on
war, even to the extent that philosophers, unmindful of
that Greek saying, 'War is a bad bet because it produces
more evil people than it eliminates,' have praised it
as having a certain ennobling influence on mankind.
(Kant, 1983/1795, p. 123; emphasis original)
This is a very perceptive and interesting blend of two views:
the belief that humans are innately warlike and the idea that
war has the magic transformative power to actualize the finest
aspects of human nature. Kant concedes a certain amount of
truth to both views, but it is of much greater importance to
notice that the context in which he discusses them-his famous
essay on "perpetual peace"-builds a strong argument on
behalf of a rational arrangement of mutual interest by which
nations can abolish war.
We needn't be frightened, then, of the theory that war has
developed cooperative skills in our own (and closely related)
species. Let us assume that war has done so, rather than
struggle resignedly against admitting the possibility. Many
other activities have also undoubtedly co-developed these
same skills. And the conclusion we ought, therefore, to reach is
that maybe the route we have followed to this end is in some
ways unfortunate, but the cooperative skills now exist and can
be used and developed further in new settings. In this respect,
as in many others, the future doesn't have to resemble the past,
with ourselves as mere passive and despairing onlookers. It
can, on the contrary, be consciously, conscientiously fashioned
by us, and this gives grounds for hope that we will do so.
Looking again at Kant's comments, we can see that they
confirm the claim (also found in the observations by Hedges
cited in the previous section) that war produces a strong sense
of common purpose and solidarity. This assertion should
not be dismissed lightly. It was acknowledgment of this fact
that motivated James to introduce the important idea of a
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"moral equivalent of war" (James, 1987/1910), that is, some
participatory activity or activities that are capable of yielding
the same beneficial outcomes for humanity as war does. While
James' and Kant's accounts expressed the masculinist bias of
their times, they nevertheless made an important point, and
ongoing research is providing evidence about alternative
activities that produce the rewards and emotional outlets often
attributed to war (MacNair, 2003). But in the end, the question
remains whether, for the vast majority of humans of both sexes
(the dead, injured, maimed, and all noncombatants), this is the
most relevant issue. Furthermore, given the fragile state of the
world today and the costs of war, one group of psychologists
remarked that "peace cannot wait until all the data are in"
(Winter, Christie, Wagner, & Boston, 2001).
Another perspective that tends to foster pessimism about
our species' warlike nature is Freud's theory of the "death
instinct." With an intellectual lineage deriving from Empedocles
in ancient Greece, this formulation first appeared in Freud's
(1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle and was developed in
several subsequent works. Most of Freud's early students and
followers rejected the theory, with the notable exception of
Melanie Klein, but renewed interest in it has been stimulated
by French psychoanalysts Jacques Lacan and Jean Laplanche.
Philosopher Richard Boothby, an expert on Lacan, argued that
the death instinct is "the darkest and most stubborn riddle
posed by the legacy of psychoanalysis" (Boothby, 1991, p. 1).
In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" Freud
(1964/1937) argued that there are "unmistakable indications
of the presence of a power in mental life which we call the
instinct of aggression or of destruction according to its aims,
and which we trace back to the original death instinct of living
matter" (p. 243). The death instinct entered the scene primarily
to explain neurosis, masochism, certain kinds of dreams, and
other phenomena as surrogate forms of self-punishment or
self-eradication, and human psychic life came to be understood
as the site of a struggle between "Eros" (the life instinct) and
"Thanatos" (the death instinct). Eros includes impulses that
"seek to preserve and unite," and the death instinct those that
are motivated by hatred and "seek to destroy and kill." Yet
Freud insisted that each is equally "essential" to our makeup
(Freud, 1964/1933, p. 209).
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Which tendency will triumph? Freud eventually postulated
that the death drive threatens to overwhelm the life drive in
each of us (rather than the reverse, or some state of equilibrium
being reached). Against this background, he saw civilization
as the somewhat precarious process whereby humans learn
to sacrifice raw expression of instinctual drives in favor of
stability, sociability, and the rule of law. Instinctual energies are
channelled into other avenues of endeavor, and although social
disintegration and war are constant disruptive tendencies
within the human condition, Freud paradoxically envisioned
the possibility that we all may even become pacifists one day
(Freud, 1964/1933).
Freud's death instinct has not gained much traction in
psychoanalysis and the social sciences, but it certainly appears
to have passed into the everyday and literary imaginations
as a way of capturing our predicament, and references to a
"collective death wish" are not uncommon in popular culture.
This is entirely understandable in view of the persistence
of warfare and violence as means of settling disputes and
conflicts of various kinds, dealing with offences and exacting
revenge, nefarious strategies for advancing interests, and the
like; the manufacture and proliferation of high-tech weapons
and weapons of mass destruction; and the burgeoning of
cultural products concerned with death, destruction, torture,
the symbolism of death and aggression, and so on. One might
likewise be forgiven for pondering a collective death wish
given the neglectful behavior of human beings toward their
own kind, and our abuse of other species, the environment,
and the planet as a whole.
Whether the idea of a universal death instinct in humans
belongs within the realm of fact or fantasy, I shall not judge
here. However, as even Freud himself realized, we must
resist entrapment by its deterministic tone; we can only act
meaningfully when we choose our own destiny as a species,
and this entails addressing and taking charge of both the best
and the worst in us. Once again, this insight beckons us toward
the study of peace as an alternative pathway.
The Costs of War
The devastating effects of war in the modern world need
little elaboration, nor does the non-productivity of aggressive
25
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violence on the individual and group levels. But it may help
to place the present investigation of peace in perspective if
we confront a few facts and figures. To start with, as Cortright
(2008) correctly argued, "the permanent mobilization for war
that emerged in the wake of World War II reinforced the pre-
disposition of political leaders to use military force and created
greater institutional capacities to intervene in the affairs of
other countries" (p. 155). Superpowers and other major powers
among nations have followed this route numerous times in the
postwar decades, because adherence to militarized policy has
"devalued diplomatic approaches" (Cortright, 2008, p. 123).
War-preparedness is very costly and it inspires the mind-
set that: "we've paid for all this stuff, so we'd better use it" (to
justify the cost to taxpayers and legislators); or: "we might as
well use it" (because it can be used, needs to be tried out, and
so on). During the Cold War, there was also the motivation to
"use it or lose it," exacerbated by fears of a nuclear first strike.
This arguably caused much of the stress and social anxiety of
that era, for leaders and citizenry alike, although fortunately
the ultimate weapons were never deployed.
Annual global military expenditures in 2009 were reliably
estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute at 1.53 trillion U.S. dollars. This represents a six
percent increase in real terms over the previous year and a
forty-nine percent increase since 2000. Nearly half of the world
total is accounted for by the American defense budget. In
contrast, the entire budget of the United Nations is a pitiful 1.8
percent of the world military expense total (Shah, 2010b). This
is the "big picture" cost of war-preparedness. Meanwhile, the
gross disparity between the world's rich and poor continues,
and is appalling by any measure. Peace and development
activist and author Vijay Mehta observed that: "This emphasis
on militarism stands in sharp contrast to the social deficit of
humanity. Almost half the world's people live in abject poverty"
(Mehta, 2006, p. 1). It is easily concluded that diversion of a
substantial portion of the massive military costs borne by
nations today into solving global problems of living by means
other than the use of deadly force and threats is money better
spent on finding solutions to our common security issues. With
specific reference to the United States, the National Priorities
26
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Project, an Internet resource, invites viewers to see how tax
dollars spent on defense (including weapons development)
could alternatively be allocated to socially beneficial programs,
nationally, by state, by congressional district, and by city, town,
or county (National Priorities Project, n.d.).
There is also the "big picture" cost of actual warfare. As
can readily be seen, this cost is wholly disproportionate to
the investment in human well-being that good sense would
prescribe, and opens up a seemingly all-consuming, bottomless
pit of financial burden. The U.S.-led wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have had 1.26 trillion dollars allocated to them in
the period up to March 4, 2011 by the U.S. federal government
(National Priorities Project, n.d.). This unfathomable sum
does not include: costs to other countries participating in the
Coalition; costs borne by individual taxpayers, servicemen
and women and their families; loss of government services
traded off against military expenditures; and future costs
such as medical care for veterans and interest on the national
debt incurred by deficit financing (National Priorities Project,
n.d.). Nor, of course, does it include all the many costs to the
Iraqi and Afghan peoples; to neighboring countries that have
had to deal with refugees and other spillover effects; and
the collateral damage that is intangible, difficult to verify or
quantify, and far-reaching, such as increased hatred and anger
toward the U.S. and its allies, the use of Iraq as a terrorist
training arena, assaults on civil liberties and international law,
fanning the flames of other conflicts, aggravation of personal
risk in international travel, and so on. It is typical of warfare
to have a large range of costs (including unintended ones) and
"invisible," intangible effects that unroll for decades afterwards
(Tyner, 2010).
One of these "invisible" or little reported, little considered
effects is that on women and children, who traditionally bear
many of the costs of war. An example comes from the civil war
that has torn apart the Democratic Republic of Congo since
August 1998. Although "the world's deadliest conflict since
World War II," as one observer put it (Shah, 2010a, p. 1), this
horrible war is "forgotten" by most of us, notwithstanding the
involvement of seven countries, and a toll to date of 5.4 million
dead and 1.5 million people internally displaced or made
27
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refugees. While children comprise nineteen percent of the
population, they represent forty-seven percent of the fatalities
(Beaumont, 2010; Shah, 2010a). In addition, "thousands upon
thousands of women, girls and children ... suffer brutal sexual
violence, which is the worst in the world, the UN says" (Rice,
2008, p. 19). Rape is one of the most universal and egregious
forms of human rights violation during periods of armed
conflict, women and children having always been regarded as
among the spoils of war and as instruments for humiliating
the enemy (Jones, 2010).
A second example concerns Israel's invasion of Gaza that
began in late December 2008. In this operation over 1,400 people
were killed, a large majority of whom were noncombatants, and
more than 5,300 were injured. In excess of 5,000 homes were
destroyed or severely damaged, another 16,000 "moderately
damaged," and subsequent importation of essentials "has been
insufficient to meet the needs of the 1.5 million people trapped
inside the Gaza Strip" (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,
2009, p. 13). Estimates of total damage range up to two billion
U.S. dollars and above. The United Nations Committee on the
Rights of the Child has recently stated:
In particular, the Committee is deeply disturbed by
the psychological effects on children in Gaza resulting
from [Israel's 2008-09] Operation 'Cast Lead' and the
lack of assistance for these children. The Committee
is furthermore concerned over the lack of adequate
programmes for rehabilitation of children who have
been victims of anti-personnel mines. (United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2010, point 37)
Amore general finding is that: "Among the consequences of
war, the impact on the mental health of the civilian population
is one of the most significant" (Murthy & Lakshminarayana,
2005, p. 25) with children, not surprisingly, standing out as es-
pecially vulnerable.
Another background effect of war--collateral damage to
victor and vanquished alike-is the lingering impact upon
veterans. Up to twenty percent of service personnel return-
ing from present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suffer from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but even more alarming
28
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is the fact that nearly sixty percent of those treated at veterans'
hospitals are veterans of a war that ended over four decades
ago. "Even as Vietnam veterans now enter their 60s and begin
to die off," it is reported, "the number seeking P.T.S.D. treat-
ment is growing" (Winerip, 2009, p. 2). Leaving aside the mon-
etary cost of veterans' payouts of all kinds (around 44.7 billion
dollars in 2009), one can easily see that a terrible price is being
paid by those who fought and still fight these wars.
A final example of the easily ignored or overlooked effects
of war is its environmental impact. According to geographer
Joni Seager, "Militaries are the world's biggest environmental
vandals, whether at war or in peace. ... [Tjhe environmental
costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the
costs of war" (Seager, 1995, p. xi). But beyond generalities, con-
sider briefly the Gulf War (1990-91). Saddam Hussein's Iraqi
forces deliberately "dumped approximately one million tons
of crude oil [from Kuwait] into the Persian Gulf"; and "Crude
oil was also spilled into the desert, forming oil lakes covering
50 square kilometers. In due time the oil percolated into under-
ground aquifers" (Enzler, 2006, p. 1). The effects on wildlife,
sea-dwelling food sources, and human health were predict-
ably vast. Meanwhile, Coalition air attacks on Iraqi installa-
tions released quantities of nerve gas into the Tigris River, and
"Soon after the ceasefire was signed, U.N. observers declared
this salient river dead" (Thomas, 1995, p. 123). At the time, it
was reported that bombing campaigns in Iraq "consume 12
million gallons of fuel a day," and that the amount of bombs
dropped on Iraq and Kuwait "is generally believed to exceed
what was used in all of World War II" (Kifner, 1991, p. 1). In ad-
dition to obvious military targets, "Croplands, barns and grain
silos were ... attacked, along with irrigation floodgates that
caused vast incursions of seawater into southern Iraq, killing
crops and permanently salting farmland" (Thomas, 1995, p.
124). A group of scientific researchers, in the conclusion of their
article, noted simply that "The Iraqi occupation and the subse-
quent armed conflict devastated the terrestrial environment of
Kuwait" (Omar, Briskey, Misak, & Asem, 2000, p. 336).
The preceding account provides only a minute slice of the
actual or suspected environmental damage resulting from this
war. Recovery and rehabilitation of regional ecosystems have
29
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
been long-term processes and some good outcomes have been
claimed (Omar, et al., 2000; Brauer, 2009). In the larger context,
there are ongoing discussions in the literature aimed at defin-
ing accountability for ecological damage in wartime and de-
veloping guidelines that will help limit negative environmen-
tal consequences in military operations (Austin & Bruch, 2000;
Brauer, 2009). It is important to observe here that the issue
is not whom we should blame for starting a particular con-
flict; who did the most damage; whether recovery and reha-
bilitation are viable after technologically advanced warfare; or
whether national policies to restrict environmental destruction
in wartime can be framed (in the spirit of just-war doctrine).
The point is that war and a healthy planet are incompatible
states of affairs.
Ron Paul, a Texas Republican congressman, physician,
and U.S. Air Force veteran, has written that: "The cost of war
is always more than anticipated. If all the costs were known
prior to the beginning of a war, fewer wars would be fought"
(Paul, 2005, p. 1). This assessment may be too optimistic, as
it assumes a level of rationality tragically often bracketed out
of the equation that leads to war-making. Nevertheless, Paul's
conclusion that: "Most wars could be avoided with better
diplomacy, a mutual understanding of minding one's own
business, and respect for the right of self-determination" (p. 1)
shines forth as a truth we would all do well to memorize and
implement.
Why We Need Peace
Given the level of violence in the world today, as well as
the waste of resources and human potential that war and prep-
arations for war represent, there is an acute need for peace ev-
erywhere. War and preparations for war are bad for all living
things-socially, economically, environmentally, and in terms
of survival and basic well-being. To say that war is bad for us
is one thing; to say that peace is good for us is another. Some,
but not all, will regard the latter, as much as the former, as
obviously true. I hope this essay will have shown it to be so.
Nothing can be lost, however, and much is to be gained, by
briefly reviewing why we need peace.
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One way to pursue this goal is to invoke the perspectives of
"negative peace" and "positive peace," as they are commonly
called. My argument is that we can readily discern the benefits
of peace under both of these headings. Negative peace refers
to the absence of war and violent hostilities. This includes or
may include the cessation of armed conflict, the ending of ter-
ritorial occupation, the withdrawal and decommissioning of
armaments and armed forces, arms limitation treaties, amnes-
ties, and the like. Negative peace offers relief or freedom from
war, which is an essential prerequisite for the resumption and
continuation of everyday life. Clearly, negative peace, if main-
tained, offers the benefits of security, repatriation, rebuilding,
and reconciliation. It doesn't take peace scholars, though, to
make people realize that this is only part of the story, and this
is where positive peace comes into the picture.
Positive peace signifies the domain of options afforded by
negative peace and what can be accomplished therein. We may
call this "real peace" because it embraces all the processes and
projects out of which a better world can emerge. Perhaps it
will be objected that to speak of a peaceful world as a better
world begs the question whether peace is a preferable state of
affairs. Against this, however, it must be observed that peace
offers many benefits that war and preparation for war grossly
stunt or eliminate, and that rational choice would clearly seem
to favor. Examples are: replacement of tension-driven rhetoric
by less alienating and more constructive forms of discourse;
greater scope for developing healthy, cooperative relations
among nations and peoples; the chance to improve national
infrastructures, education and other human resources; the
prospect of dismantling forms of structural violence (such as
poverty, hunger and political repression) with greater energy
and the redirection of effort to matters of equality and equal
opportunity; the chance to focus more carefully on environ-
mental issues and even to exploit the potential for evolving
international environmental cooperation as a means to build
sustainable global peace; the opening up of space for personal
transformation (so-called "inner peace"); and in general, the
encouragement to think about alternative ways of coexisting
that have not been thought of or tried out before. Peace is not
an easy path, for very entrenched psychological traits and
habits stand in the way, but the rewards are worth the effort.
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The Appeal of Peace
Historian Michael Howard wrote: "Peace may or may not
be 'a modern invention' but it is certainly a far more complex
affair than war" (Howard, 2000, pp. 1-2). If so, then it may be
that peace needs to be "sold" after all, if only in the sense that
informing ourselves concerning what peace is and might be
all about is the first step toward achieving a peaceful world. In
keeping with this objective, I close with a series of observations
labelled "home truths," which I hope will reinforce the reflec-
tions on why we need peace offered in the previous section.
Specifically, these statements are intended to be expressions
of common sense that invite a more detailed consideration of
peace by each of us.
Home Truths
* All members of our species (not to mention other
species) have a common interest in survival.
* Humans have survived evolution thus far because
of their social skills (including caring and nurturing
behavior) as well as communication skills, rather than
because of their aggressive and violent tendencies.
* Security (a sense of safety and a positive quality
of life) is a common interest of all human beings.
Nationally, security signifies territorial integrity, the
preservation and flourishing of certain values and
ways of life, as well as self-sufficiency in defensive
strategies and economic, energy, and resource matters.
At the personal level, security embraces a safe and
healthy natural and social environment, well-being,
a decent standard of living, meaningful employment,
adequate housing, freedom of expression, participation
in decision-making processes that affect one's life, and
for children, being loved, looked after, and educated.
* In a rapidly changing, "globalized" world, the
vulnerability of every individual, group, and nation is
increasingly apparent. Given that security (on various
levels) is desirable, reducing levels of vulnerability
becomes a paramount goal.
* If we (no matter whom the word "we" designates)
have basic security needs, then it is fair to assume that
this is also true of everyone else (every other "we,"
whether a loose collection of individuals, an identifiable
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group, or a nation). In a global community, such as the
one that exists today, security cannot be unilaterally or
militarily assured; it must be a project of reciprocity.
* It is better (easier in practice, and more effective,
economical, and conducive to mutual security and well-
being) to realize one's interests and achieve one's goals
by nonviolent rather than by violent means. It is better
to avoid or prevent violent conflict than to manage or
resolve it after the fact, just as it is better to prevent any
kind of damage than to repair it.
* True security entails attempting to remove or reduce
the causes of war and violent conflict, many of which
are well-known or obvious, even if not equally well
understood. Forexample:poverty;historicalinequalities
and injustices; colonialism; lack of access to resources;
abuse of power; unfair trade practices; unsustainable
development; unethical exploitation of markets and
foreign economies; violation and undermining of
international law; lack of trust; aggressive foreign
relations; proliferation of weaponry; inability to see
beyond narrow self-interest or national interest; and
lack of cooperation in defining and solving common
problems.
* Armed conflict cannot continue indefinitely without
destroying that for which we are fighting. In the end,
it must give way to communication and learning how
to coexist. Focusing on the latter processes instead of
the former is less painful all around and offers greater
positive benefits to all concerned.
* Notwithstanding what we constantly imbibe from
the media, everyday human life is largely based on
peaceful transactions, which, in normal circumstances,
we build upon, either instinctively or deliberately.
Pondering the above statements and others like them might
just help clear a space within which a constructive conversation
about peace can occur-one that invites all interested persons
to become involved therein. Either we will end war and prepa-
rations for war or they will end us. Ending them, therefore, is
not just a choice, it is also an imperative. Discussion of what
peace is, or could be, and of how we can obtain it must there-
fore be kept at the forefront of public dialogue and discussions
of social welfare.
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